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Twenty-seven states are currently enforcing statutes that require parental
involvement in the abortion decisions of minors.I These states require the minor
(or her physician) to notify or obtain consent from a parent before proceeding
with an abortion.2 Parental involvement statutes are constitutionally required to
have a "bypass procedure" that allows a minor to appear before a judge or
independent decision-maker for the purpose of demonstrating that (1) she is
mature, or (2) abortion without parental notification is in her best interests.3
The serious impact of these statutes upon the lives of adolescents cannot be
* I would like to acknowledge Professor Joan Krauskopf, Jefferson Liston, Stephen
Zavestoski, John B. Heasley, and Cynthia Sanders for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Note. I would also like to thank my family and friends, especially
Elizabeth Ziewacz, for their support and encouragement.
I See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 12 Cal. 4th 1007, 1031 n.10 (1996).
The states include: Alabama, Alaska, California, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Parental involvement
statutes, in ascending order of the burden they impose on the minor are: one-parent
notification statutes, two-parent notification statutes, one-parent consent statutes, and two-
parent consent statutes. See Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1338 (1993).
2 The Supreme Court has held that parental notification and parental consent statutes are
not equivalent. See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti ), 443 U.S. 622, 639-40 (1979). However,
because the same issues are weighed in these cases, they are considered together in this Note.
This approach is supported by commentators who have argued that the notion of "guided"
choice which supports parental notification statutes in fact opens the door to parental
persuasion and pressure that "effectively transforms a notification statute into a consent
statute." Harvard Law Review Association, Parental Notification Prior to Abortions for
Immature Minors, 95 HARv. L. REv. 142, 147 (1981).
3 See Bellotti I/, 443 U.S. at 643-44. A judicial bypass procedure must satisfy four
criteria as set forth by Bellotti ff. Id. at 643-45. The bypass procedure must (1) allow a minor
to demonstrate that she is mature enough to make an abortion decision in consultation with a
doctor; (2) grant permission if the minor is not found mature, but an abortion is in her best
interests; (3) preserve the minor's anonymity; and (4) proceed expeditiously. See Causeway
Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 905 F. Supp. 360, 363-64 (1995).
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minimized. More than one million adolescents become pregnant each year.4 Of
these pregnancies, more than half are carried to term, and slightly fewer than
half are terminated.5 The percentage of pregnancies that result in abortion is
higher for adolescents-especially young adolescents-than among adults
because adolescents are more likely to experience an unwanted pregnancy. 6
Since 1976, the United States Supreme Court has reviewed parental
involvement statutes ten times. 7 Social science analysis of adolescent abortion
has paralleled the development of parental notification statutes. During this
time, social scientists conducted numerous empirical studies analyzing
adolescent abortion and the impact of parental involvement statutes. 8 This
research has produced substantial converging evidence regarding (1) the
consequences of a decision to carry an unwanted teenage pregnancy to term
compared to a decision to terminate the pregnancy, (2) the decisionmaking
capabilities of minors, and (3) the psychological stress of the pregnancy
disposition decision.9 Despite ample opportunity to examine this sizable and
convincing body of research, the Court has yet to re-examine the assumptions
4 See Stanley K. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Teenage Abortion, Birth and Pregnancy
Statistics: An Update, 21 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 85, 85 (1989).
5 See id. "Teenagers terminate 42% of their pregnancies through abortion, twice the rate
for women between the ages of twenty-five to thirty-four." Deborah Jones Merritt, Ending
Poverty By Cutting Teenaged Births: Promise, Failure, and Paths to the Future, 57 Omno ST.
L.J. 441, 447 (citing Jacqueline D. Forrest & Susheela Singh, The Sexual and Reproductive
Behavior of American Women, 1982-1988, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 206, 212 (1990)).
6 See Henshaw & Van Vort, supra note 4, at 85.
7 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (upholding one-parent
consent statute with a judicial bypass provision); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health,
497 U.S. 502, 507--08 (1990) (upholding one-parent notice statute with bypass provision);
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 457-58 (1990) (plurality) (upholding two-parent
notification statute with a judicial bypass provision); Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171, 171
(1987) (per curiam); Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983),
overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (striking down a one-parent
consent statute); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 494 (1983) (upholding a
Missouri one-parent consent statute with judicial bypass); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,
413 (1981) (upholding a one-parent notification statute); Bellotti /, 443 U.S. 622, 622 (1979)
(striking down a Massachusetts law requiring two-parent consent because of its inadequate
judicial bypass provision); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 1), 428 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1976);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 83-84 (1976) (striking down a Missouri
statute requiring one-parent consent).
8 For further discussion and analysis of these studies, see infra Part IV.
9 A "pregnancy disposition decision," as used in this Note, is the process of selecting
whether to carry the pregnancy to term and keep the child, to carry the pregnancy to term and
give the child up for adoption, or to terminate the pregnancy.
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that are the foundation of its approval of parental involvement statutes.10
An analysis of substantial empirical data about the capabilities of pregnant
minors exposes many flaws in the Supreme Court's conclusions in parental
involvement cases. First, detailed documentation of the perils of teenage
motherhood reveals the dangers in the state's obstruction of adolescent
abortion.'1 Second, the presumption that children are incompetent serves as a
paradigm for the Supreme Court's treatment of pregnant minors.12 While the
Court has rejected the proposition that pregnant minors must be presumed
mature13 enough to make their pregnancy disposition decision, the weight of
10lThat the Court has been willing to change its approach to issues in light of new facts
or social science evidence is illustrated by Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-95. (For further
discussion, see infra Part III.E.). The Court was also moved to re-evaluate the "separate but
equal doctrine" in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court
was influenced by testimony from psychologists and educators that reported that segregation
led to feelings of inferiority in African American youth. See Sandra M. Secrest, Note,
Minors' Rights to Abortion: Are Parental Notice and Consent Laws Justified?, 66 U. DEr. L.
REv. 691, 710 n.118 (1989). Even in the most recent, seemingly sympathetic analysis of
children's abortion rights by appellate courts, recent research has not been considered. In
Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1582
(1996), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the state had no legitimate interest
in imposing parental notification, a substantial obstacle, in the way of pregnant mature
minors. However, the court in Miller referred these minors to the judicial bypass created by
dated assumptions about the maturity and vulnerability of young women. See id. at 1452,
1468. In an April 1996 decision upholding the California parental involvement statute, the
California Supreme Court rejected trial court findings concerning the decisionmaking
capabilities of adolescents. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 12 Cal. 4th
1007, 1024 (1996). Witnesses and deponents at trial included medical professionals and many
of the distinguished scientists cited in this Note. See id. at 1046-50. Although this testimony
proved persuasive to the trial court, the California Supreme Court held that the justifications
of parental involvement statutes are based on "normative assumptions about the family" and
these social norms are not outweighed by a "battle of the experts" presenting generalized data
regarding adolescents. Id. at 1024 n.7.
1 For further discussion, see infra Part W.A.
12 See Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Infonned Consent for
Mental Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 695, 707 (1993) (citing Gerald P.
Koocher, Children Under the Law, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 6 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1977)); see also Harvard Law Review
Association, supra note 2, at 145 (finding that the right to choose an abortion presupposes the
capacity to make a mature choice).
13 "Maturity" is a problematic term throughout this Note. The problem of defining
maturity in the adolescent abortion context is that most legislatures and the United States
Supreme Court presume that adolescents are immature and may only be adjudicated to be
mature. This Note rejects that presumption. This Note's definition of mature is the ability or
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research provides a convincing challenge to this position by showing that
minors exhibit adult-level reasoning. 14 Furthermore, parental involvement does
not seem to have the effect of facilitating better-reasoned abortion decisions. 15
Third, to some extent, research confirms the Supreme Court's belief that
minors are vulnerable when making an abortion decision. However, it also
shows that the bypass procedure actually exacerbates this stress in two ways:
(1) facing a judge in a bypass procedure is stressful and demeaning to the
pregnant minor; 16 and (2) when a mature minor does not wish to inform her
parent, the few adults who have dedicated time to assist the young woman
(including clinic staff, counselors, and attorneys) must waste time that could be
spent counseling her to prepare her for a court appearance. In many senses, the
failure of the Court to question its assumptions has left pregnant minors with the
worst of both worlds: they get neither the full constitutional protection accorded
to adults nor the solicitous treatment postulated for children. 17
capacity to understand and reason about factors relevant to important decisions such as
abortion. Therefore, this Note recognizes that adolescents are mature or immature in fact
before they may be "found" to be mature by a judicial process.
14 See, e.g., Anita J. Pliner & Suzanne Yates, Psychological and Legal Issues in
Minors' Rights to Abortion, 48 J. oF Soc. IssuEs 203, 214 (1992) (concluding that "most
adolescents have achieved a sufficient level of competency by the age of fifteen to enable them
to make mature and informed decisions regarding health-related issues"). For further
discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
15 See, e.g., Robert W. Blum et al., The Impact of a Parental Notification Law on
Adolescent Abortion Decisionmaking, 77 Am. J. PuB. HEALTH 619, 620 (1987) (concluding
that there is a negligible difference in the percentage of parents involved in a minor's abortion
decision between states with and states without parental involvement statutes). For further
discussion, see infra Part IV.D.
16 See Pliner & Yates, supra note 14, at 210-11 (reporting that minors are often
questioned about issues such as the morality of their sexual activity during a judicial bypass
proceeding). For further discussion, see infra Part IV.D.
17 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966). In this case, the Court was
dealing with the application of the parens patriae doctrine to juveniles in the criminal justice
system. Parens patriae ("parent of the country") refers to the state as guardian of persons
under legal disability, such as minors. See BLACK's LAW DIcIoNARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
This doctrine presents a parallel conflict with parental involvement statutes, as the Court's
consideration is complicated by a desire to afford constitutional protections for children as
well as to enforce their best interest. Justice Fortas commented that he did not believe that the
juvenile law accorded children with full due process protections nor was it structured so as to
rehabilitate children. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-55; see also Michael J. Dale, The Supreme
Court and the Minimization of Children's Constitutional Rights: Implications for the Juvenile
Justice System, 13 HAmLiNE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 199, 200 (1992). "[C]hildren should be
entitled to both expanded constitutional rights and societal protection and.., there is nothing
inconsistent with the provision of both." Id.
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Part II of this Note introduces the key legal issues involved in the Supreme
Court's review of parental involvement statutes as they apply to the undefined
privacy rights of mature minors. Part I analyzes the significant Supreme Court
parental notification and consent cases as well as a recent Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals case, Planned Parenthood v. Miller.18 This analysis focuses upon
the Court's standards of review, its antiquated assumptions with respect to
minors, and its approach to issues presented in each case. This Part
demonstrates that the Court must (1) revisit the issue of parental involvement,
(2) reconsider its assumptions regarding the capacity of minors, and
(3) thoroughly examine the burden of unwanted pregnancy and the risks
associated with parental involvement. Part IV of this Note dissects the
arguments of the Court by examining empirical research conducted on issues
dispositive to the parental involvement cases. This Part concludes that expanded
constitutional protection must be provided for meaningful adolescent privacy
rights. Part V proposes one legislative solution that may accommodate the
needs of mature minors, so that they may navigate "the best of both worlds"
during the stressful period of their pregnancy disposition decision.
II. PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT STATUTES AND THE MATURE MINOR
The Supreme Court's divisiveness regarding the issue of abortion becomes
even more acute in cases considering the privacy rights of minors. In these
cases, the Court must weigh the reproductive rights of minors, the rights of
parents to exercise authority over children, and the state's interest in assuring
the best interests of minors.' 9 The Court's examination of the privacy rights of
minors focuses upon (1) precedent regarding parental authority to control the
household 20 balanced with the state's parens patriae interests, 21 and
(2) assumptions about the incompetence and vulnerability of minors. 22 In each
18 63 F.3d 142 (8th Cir. 1995).
19 See Bellotti /, 443 U.S. 622, 634-39.
20 See id. at 637-38. The right to raise one's children is predicated upon privacy and due
process protections. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). This theory
illustrates the "property model" of the parent/child relationship, which asserts that "our
culture makes assumptions about children deeply analogous to those it adopts in thinking
about property." Satsie Veith, Note, The Judicial Bypass Procedure and Adolescents'
Abortion Rights: The Fallacy of the "Maturity" Standard, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 453, 464
(1994) (quoting Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Cdld?"- Meyer and Pierce
and the Cdld as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1042 (1992)).
21 See Bellotti H, 443 U.S. at 636.
22 See id. at 649.
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parental involvement case, the Court's "incapacity theory" 23 was the basis for
its approval of state regulation of adolescent abortion. On its face, the Court's
incapacity theory invites psychological inquiry.24 However, once the Supreme
Court deemed its theory unassailable, it avoided empirical analysis, shunned
convincing theoretical scrutiny, and instead relied upon the "pages of
experience" to test the applicability of its assumptions.25
In its line of parental involvement cases, the Court has held that
(1) absolute, third-party veto is unconstitutional, 26 (2) one-parent consent is
constitutional if an expeditious judicial bypass procedure is available, 27 and
(3) one-parent notification is constitutional. 28 However, the Court has yet to
decide the scope of the privacy rights of mature minors. 29 The Court has
applied two separate standards of review in parental involvement cases, both
less stringent than the "compelling state interest" 30 or "undue burden" 31 tests
required for adult women. The standard of review to be applied is dependent
upon the standing of the party challenging the statute. When statutes have been
challenged as applied to all minors, the Court has required that a "significant
state interest" 32 justify regulation of abortion. When the statute was challenged
by an immature, unemancipated minor, the Court found that an "important
state interest" 33 justified abortion restrictions. The Court's "sliding scale"
23 "Capacity" in this Note is defined as "competence to consent for a particular
treatment." See Redding, supra note 12, at 710 n.83.24 See Gary B. Melton & Anita J. Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis,
in ADoLESCENT ABORTION: PsYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL IssuEs 1, 9 (Gary B. Melton ed.,
1986).
25 See id.
26 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). Third-party veto may
occur when parent and child disagree over the pregnancy disposition decision and the view of
the parent prevails. See id. at 71.
27 See Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 643 (1979). "Judicial bypass procedure" is used in this
Note in accord with the meaning set forth in Bellotti II, as a "term of art" including juvenile
court dispositions, administrative agency hearings, and even less formal proceedings. Id. at
643 n.22.
28 See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981).
29 See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1459 (1995), cert. denied, Janldow
v. Planned Parenthood, 116 S. Ct. 1582 (1996); Matheson, 450 U.S. at 414 (Powell &
Stewart, JJ., concurring) (joining with the majority in stating that the decision left open to
question whether the Utah statute unconstitutionally burdens a mature or best interests minor).
30 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973), modified by Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
31 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
32 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
33 See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413.
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standard of review demonstrates the possibility that mature minors would be
extended the same privacy rights as adult women, and that the Court would
therefore apply a strict standard of review. 34 Clearly, the maturity of a minor 35
dissolves some of the seemingly potent state concerns regarding the
vulnerability of the adolescent and the subsequent necessity of parental
involvement. This leaves a single state concern: the facilitation of well-reasoned
abortion decisions. Parental involvement statutes disproportionately affect older,
more mature minors. Therefore, it is critical that the Court define the scope of
mature minors' privacy rights with respect to these statutes.
III. KEY SUPREME COURT PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT CASES
A. Background
Supreme Court parental involvement case law reflects the tension among
(1) individual rights of young women to abort, (2) individual rights of parents to
raise their children, and (3) the state's right, as parens patriae, to protect the
welfare of children.36 The individual right to an abortion is guaranteed to all
women, including minors, 37 but it is not absolute.38 Likewise, the right of a
34 Commentators have suggested that Matheson eliminated the intermediate standard
applied in Bellotti 11:
If a minor is mature, she should be treated as an adult with respect to her constitutional
right to choose to have an abortion.... A statute that applies to all minors, whether
mature or immature, need not therefore be measured by the intermediate, "significant
state interest" test. If the plaintiff has standing to challenge the statute as a mature minor,
the Court should strike down the statute as applied to mature minors unless it is
necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 2, at 149. Unfortunately, this standard has not
been applied by the Court in its review of parental involvement statutes since Matheson. See,
e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
35 It is beyond the scope of this Note to resolve all issues regarding access for immature
minors, although many suggestions made in Parts IV and V of this Note are equally
applicable to those minors.
36 See Kristen J. Brown, Note, Bellotti v. Baird: The Impropriety of Extending the
Invalid Assumptions of Bellotti to Determine the Constitutionality of Pure Notification
Statutes, 18 CAP. U. L. REV. 297,299 (1989).
37See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75.
38 "Ihe right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but... this right is
not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation." Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
19961
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parent to raise a child free from state interference is not beyond limitation.39
The independent right of the state to intervene to assure the well-being of
minors is justified by society's interest in protecting the welfare of children and
the recognition that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided.40
The acknowledgment of the legal identity of children in the realm of
privacy rights is a significant departure from the common law, which equated
minority and incompetency and denied the legal identity of children.41 "The
basic rationale for depriving people of rights in a dependency relationship is
that certain individuals are incapable or undeserving of the right to take care of
themselves and consequently need social institutions specifically designed to
safeguard their position." 42 The strength with which this traditional view of
children gripped the Supreme Court is evident in the fact that it did not
expressly extend constitutional rights to children until 1967.43 The extent to
which the Court seriously considers the privacy rights of minors over traditional
assumptions about children has been dispositive in parental involvement cases.
B. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth: The Recognition of Minors' Privacy
Rights
The Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth44 scrutinized a
Missouri statute that required parental consent before a minor could obtain an
abortion. The Court held that the Missouri legislature did not have
constitutional authority to require parental consent that would have the effect of
(1992).
3 9 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (affirming the conviction of a
member of Jehovah's Witnesses for child labor violations for requiring her niece to sell
religious magazines on street comers).
40 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (affirming conviction for
selling obscene materials to minors); see also Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (recognizing that the
state has an interest in protecting the welfare of children, in safeguarding them from abuses,
and in assuring that they grow into free and well-developed adults); Barry C. Feld,
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV.
141, 148 (1984) ("Parens patriae [is] the right and responsibility of the state to substitute its
own control over children... when the [natural parents are] unable or unwilling to meet their
responsibilities .... ").
41 See George H. Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K."." A Child's Right to
Be Heard, 27 FAM. L.Q. 365, 369 (1993).
4 2 Id. at 369 (citing Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV.
487 (1973)).
43 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that a child, merely on account of
age, is not beyond constitutional protection).
44 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
1738 [Vol. 57:1731
WORST OF BOTH WORLDS
a blanket, third-party veto.45 The Court required the state to assert a
"significant" state interest for regulating minors' abortion rights rather than the
"compelling" state interest required for the abortion rights of adult women. 46
"The Danforth opinion thus reaffirmed the notion that the state's somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than that of adults
demands the use of a less rigorous standard in determining the scope of
permissible limitations on children's constitutional rights." 47
Despite the application of an intermediate test, the Court weighed the
privacy rights of pregnant minors heavily in reaching its decision. 48 The Court
held that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority[;]" 49 therefore, minors
do possess constitutional rights. The Court protected an adolescent's right to
make decisions regarding her reproductive future without consultation with or
disclosure to anyone except her physician.50 The state's interests5' in
safeguarding the family unit and parental authority were not significant enough
to justify parental consent because "[a]ny independent interest the parent may
have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is not more weighty
than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become
pregnant. "52
45 See id. at 74 (plurality).
46 See id. at 75.
47 Brown, supra note 36, at 299.
48 Clearly, Danforth was a departure from the traditional view of children as incapable
and undeserving of privacy rights. The Court presumed that many minors have the ability to
consent to pregnancy-related services by virtue of their pregnancy. Given this capacity to
make a choice, minors can be presumed to have a privacy right to choose abortion.
49 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. However, the Court emphasized that its holding "does not
suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for
termination of her pregnancy." Id. at 75.
50 See id. This holding embodies the informational and decisionmaking privacy rights as
they were articulated for all women in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973), modified
by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
5 1 The Court found that the state concerns of safeguarding the family unit and preserving
parental authority were permissible. Nevertheless, it rejected the proposition that giving the
parent absolute power over the pregnancy disposition decision would add strength to the
family unit. The Court also stated that granting parental veto power would cause further
conflict in families that have already been fractured by the existence of the pregnancy. See
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
52 Id. Although it has since backpedaled on its position that a minor may be mature by
virtue of her pregnancy, the Court's admission that a pregnant minor may be presumed
competent is crucial to an examination of parental involvement. This presumption is
consistent with state consent statutes that allow pregnant minors to consent to pregnancy-
17391996]
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C. Bellotti II: The Creation of Alternative Procedures
Three years later, in Bellotti 11,53 the Court concluded that a Massachusetts
law requiring parental consent (or judicial approval after parental notification)
unconstitutionally burdened the right of minors because it may have the effect
of an absolute, third-party veto. 54 Although the Court invalidated the
Massachusetts statute, it went on to delineate an alternative "bypass" procedure
to adjudicate the maturity or best interests of a minor to avoid parental
involvement.55 The Court recognized the gravity of the abortion decision and
the distinction between this decision and all others made during adolescence.
"The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique nature of the
abortion decision, especially when made by a minor, require a State to act with
particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this
matter." 56 For this reason, the Court held that if a State required a minor to
seek the consent of one or more parents, it also must provide an expeditious
bypass procedure. 57
In Bellotti II, the Court set forth the basis for distinguishing between the
privacy interests of minors and adults. The Court found that constitutional rights
of children are distinguishable from the rights of adults for three reasons:
(1) the vulnerability of minors, (2) the decisionmalcing capabilities of minors,
and (3) the importance of parental involvement in childrearing. 58 These
related services. (For further discussion, see infra Part IV.B.) However, as parental
involvement case law developed, the Supreme Court also chipped away at this presumption.
In fact, in Bellotti I, the Court set forth an "incapacity theory" in support of parental
involvement in abortion decisions. See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
53 443 U.S. 622 (1979)
54 See id. at 643 (quoting Danforth, 443 U.S. at 74). Justice Stevens's opinion in Bellotti
//Cim which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined) challenged the Court's desires,
in the interests of the minor, to publicize an individual's pregnancy disposition decision by
subjecting it to public scrutiny and third-party decisionmaking. They argued that such a
decision is violative of traditional privacy rights accorded in Roe and destroys the rights
assured by Danforth. Further, a judicial bypass procedure would impose a burden at least as
great as, and maybe greater than, obtaining parental consent. See id. at 654-55 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
55 See Bellotti H, 443 U.S. at 643. A minor is entitled to a proceeding to demonstrate
either (1) that she is mature and well-informed enough to make an abortion decision
independent of parental involvement, or (2) that the abortion would be in her best interests.
This hearing must be sufficiently anonymous and expeditious, and ensure that parental
consent does not in fact amount to a third-party veto. See id. at 643-44.
5 6 1d. at 642.
57 See id. at 643.
58 See id. at 633-40.
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concerns marked a clear retreat from the Danforth decision, which recognized a
minor's presumptive maturity by virtue of her pregnancy.59 The Bellotti H
Court made clear that, "at least in some precisely delineated areas, a
child... is not possessed [with the] full capacity for individual choice."6° The
Court held that, although children are generally protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against government deprivations as adults, the state
may adjust its legal system to account for vulnerability of children and their
needs for "concern,... sympathy, and... paternal attention. "61
The Court's second concern in Bellotti II was that a child is not able to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner.62 For this reason, the
Court resolved that the State "may limit the freedom of children to choose for
themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially
serious consequences." 63 The Court presumed that during childhood and
adolescence, minors lack the "experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."64 Such
presumptions, coupled with the Court's proposal for an alternative procedure,
demonstrate a move to subordinate children's rights to both the state's parens
patriae authority and to parental authority.
The concerns expressed in the Bellotti H opinion have influenced review of
minors' privacy rights in all subsequent parental involvement cases.65 The
presumptions of the Court at first seem entirely plausible, but empirical
research has directly challenged the wisdom and accuracy of these concerns. 66
Research has concluded, for example, that adolescents are capable of adult-
level decisionmaking regarding medical and psychological treatment.67
Furthermore, the Court's "incapacity theory" directly conflicts with trends
in legislative treatment of juvenile criminals. As juvenile crime becomes more
violent, legislatures and courts have reacted with harsh enactments, including
59 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1975).
60 Bellotti H, 443 U.S. at 635-36 n.13 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
61 Id. (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)).
62 See Bellotti 1, 443 U.S. at 640.
63 Id. at 635.
64 Id. The Court made a similar recognition in Ginsberg, stating that "even where there
is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults."' Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634 (quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
65 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1459-60 (8th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 116 S. Ct. 1582 (1996).
66 For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
67 See Lois A. Weithom & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and
Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHaD DEVELOPMENT 1589 (1982).
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"adult consequences" such as mandatory bindover to adult court for juveniles
age fourteen and older, consecutive sentences, and gun specifications. 68 These
changes are based on the propositions that (1) children have become more
mature at an earlier age, and (2) children need to be punished rather than
rehabilitated. 69 In rejecting rehabilitation, legislators found children's
decisionmaking capabilities to be fully mature and culpable; increased penalties
are their just deserts. For example, California Governor Pete Wilson promoted
"get-tough" legislation, stating that "[t]hese kids are street smart. They're
gaming the system and it is in no way intimidating them." 70 Legislators no
longer propose that a benevolent parens patriae authority intervene on behalf of
the vulnerable juvenile offender as sentences are increased. 71 Instead, they
research the possibility of applying capital punishment to juveniles. 72 The
states' treatment of pregnant minors and juvenile offenders amounts to
legislative dissonance. Supreme Court jurisprudence is clearly as inconsistent in
its disparate treatment of juvenile offenders and pregnant minors:
[T]he juvenile justice system has come to mirror the Supreme Court in that it
holds a child accountable as an adult where it perceives the need to do so (often
based upon the belief that children are more mature than they used to be),
while at the same time denying full constitutional protections to juveniles in
compliance with Supreme Court mandates. 73
The third concern of the Court in Bellotti 11 involved the important role of
68 For example, the Ohio General Assembly recently enacted statutes that include these
provisions. See Oino REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.26(B), 2151.355(A)(2), 2151.355(A)(7)
(Baldwin Supp. 1996). These enactments are in accord with national trends. See Panel
Endorses Bill on Juvenile Crime, WASH. TIms, Feb. 9, 1996, at C4 (reporting "get tough"
provisions that include bindover for juveniles age 14 and older); Matt Pommer, New Code
Will Send 1O-Year-Oids to Court, CAPrrAL Tims, Nov. 17, 1995, at Al (reporting on a bill
scheduled to be signed by Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson that would decrease the
age from 12 to 10 at which juveniles are subject to trial and would also eliminate jury trials
for juveniles).69 See Dale, supra note 17, at 201; see also Rachel Zimmerman, House OKs Putting
More Teens in Adult Prisons, SEATrLE PoSr-INTE GENCER, Feb. 10, 1996, at 1 (reporting
references to violent teens as "superpredators" in floor debate).
70 Cyndee Fontana, Wilson Pushes Juvenile Reforms: Get Tough Policy for Young
Offenders Draws Fresno Support, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 27, 1996, at B1.
71 Congress increased punishment of federal crimes committed by juveniles under the
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act. See Dale, supra note 17, at 203.
72 Juveniles aged 16 to 17 may be given the death penalty. See Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
73 Dale, supra note 17, at 222.
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the parent in childrearing. 74 The Court asserted that parents undertake a crucial
societal role in teaching, guiding, and inspiring children by precept and
example-a role crucial to the growth of minors into mature, socially
responsible citizens.75 The Court was justifiably unwilling to defer to parental
rights outright in this case, 76 yet the Court did find the encouragement of
parental consultation to be constitutionally permissible and highly desirable,
assuming that parents were compassionate and supportive.77 Yet this objective
ignored the explosive number of abusive households and the documented
connection between child abuse and teenage pregnancy. Such documentation
includes, for example, a Pennsylvania study, which found that more than half
of the forty-one adolescent mothers interviewed reported some history of child
sexual abuse.78 A study in Washington state had similar findings: sixty-two
percent of 535 adolescent mothers surveyed had been raped or molested, before
they became pregnant, by a perpetrator with a mean age of 27.4 years.79
D. Parental Notification for Immature Minors in H.L. v. Matheson
The Court next confronted a Utah parental notification statute as applied to
immature, unemancipated minors, in H.L. v. Matheson.80 The Matheson Court
74 443 U.S. at 637. Further, the Court's primary consideration was that "'the custody,
care and nurture of [a] child reside first in the parents, whose primary function[s]... include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."' Id. (original emphasis
omitted) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
75 See id.
76 See id. at 643-44.
77 See id. at 640 n.20.
78 See Many Teen Mothers Were Abuse Victims, UPI, Nov. 21, 1988, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCNWS file. Eleven of these minors reported multiple experiences
of abuse. Id.
79 See Joe Klein, The Predator Problem, TIN,. Apr. 29, 1996, at 32, 32. Klein argues
that girls who become pregnant are not immoral, premature tarts, but prey. In support of this
he uses a 1990 California study that indicated that the younger the pregnant teen, the older the
male that fathered the child. Among girls ages 11-12, the father was an average of 10 years
older. See id; see also Frank L. Mott, Teen Parenting: Implications for the Mother and Child
Generations, 57 Omio ST. L.J. 469, 473 (noting an analysis of national vital statistics data that
revealed that about half of all men impregnating minors are above age 20) (citing J. David
Landry & Jacqueline D. Forrest, How Old Are U.S. Fathers?, 27 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 159,
159-65 (1995)).
80 450 U.S. 398 (1981). The minor who challenged the statute (a 15 year-old living with
her parents) was found by the Court to lack standing to challenge the statute on overbreadth
grounds because she made no claim to be emancipated nor did she show maturity. See id. at
406.
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found that parental notification was reasonably calculated to serve state interests
by (1) promoting family integrity, (2) encouraging parental consultation, and
(3) allowing parents to supply medical information.81 The decision is based
upon the Court's belief that not every minor can give effective consent to
abortion.82
Rather than require a significant state interest, the Matheson Court required
only that a statute be "narrowly drawn" to serve "important state interests"
when regulating immature, unemancipated minors.83 Presumably, this standard
is less stringent because the Court dealt only with the privacy interests of
immature minors,84 a situation in which the state parens patriae concern and
desire to facilitate parental involvement are much stronger than in cases
considering mature minors. 85 This downward adjustment of the significant stateinterest test applied in Bellotti 1186 indicates that the Court may apply a
"compelling state interest" test to the privacy rights of mature minors. 87
The Court also refused to equate the status of pregnancy with the
achievement of maturity to consent to abortion.88 This issue was raised after the
Appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Utah statute that allowed any
pregnant adolescent to give informed consent for any pregnancy-related
service, yet required an immature minor to notify a parent if she intended to
terminate a pregnancy. 89 The Court justified this incongruity on two grounds.
First, the Court held that the state may promote its interest in encouraging
childbirth rather than abortion. 90 Even though this may directly conflict with the
"minor['s] ... interest in effectuating her decision to abort," her right is not
absolute-especially given the additional state interest in facilitating parental
authority over immature minors. 91 Parental authority, however, is rejected in
statutes that give all pregnant minors the legal capacity to give informed consent
to pregnancy-related services. In addition, most states also allow minors to
consent to confidential outpatient mental health services and confidential
81 Id. at 411.
82 See id. at 408 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)).
83 Id. at 413.
84 See id. at 411.
85 The minor in Matheson was described by the Court as a "girl of tender years, under
emotional stress.... ill-equipped to make [the decision] without mature advice and emotional
support." Id. at 410 (quoting Bellotti H, 443 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting)).
86 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
87 See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 2, at 149.
88 See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 408.
89 See id. at 412 n.23 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5(4)(t) (1977)).
90 See id. at 419 (Powell and Stewart, JJ., concurring).
91 Id. at 419.
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outpatient drug and alcohol treatment. 92 Many states also recognize a common
law "mature minor exception" to the incapacity theory. 93 This exception is
based on the extent of the minor's (1) appreciation of the nature, extent, and
probable consequences of conduct; and (2) appreciation of the nature of
treatment, risks, and likelihood of successful results. 94
The Court's second justification for the encouragement of pregnancy is
based on its belief that abortion is exceptionally risky for adolescents. The
Court cited studies concluding that adolescent abortion is associated with
significant health risks.95 However, recent studies have specifically rebutted this
conclusion. It is well documented that in the United States the risk of dying
from complications related to childbirth is at least seven times greater than the
risk from having an abortion.96 The Court also concluded that the state interest
in full-term pregnancies is different because "medical decisions to be made
entail few-perhaps none-of the potentially grave emotional and psychological
consequences of the decision to abort."97 The Court cited a study which found
that adolescents had markedly more severe psychological and emotional
responses to abortion than adult women. 98 However, studies of women's
92 See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.04(A) (Anderson 1996) ("Upon the request
of a minor fourteen years of age or older, a mental health professional may provide outpatient
mental health services... without the consent or knowledge of the minor's parent or
guardian."); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3719.012(A) (Anderson 1996) ("[A] minor may give
consent for the diagnosis or treatment by a physician... of any condition which it is
reasonable to believe is caused by a drug of abuse, beer, or intoxicating liquor. Such consent
shall not be subject to disaffirmance because of minority.").
93 See, e.g., Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25 (Ohio 1956).
94 See id. To meet the mature minor exception, the adolescent must be able to
comprehend information regarding the nature of treatment, benefits, risks, and probable
consequences of the surgery as they are fully disclosed by medical personnel. Further, the
adolescent must be found reasonably mature of mind and capable of evaluating the intricacies
of her treatment. See id.
95 See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411 n.20 (citing Deborah Maine, Does Abortion Affect
Later Pregnancies?, 11 FAM. PLAN. Pow. 98 (1979)).
96 See Nancy Felipe Russo, Adolescent Abortion: The Epidemiological Context, in
ADOLESCENT ABORTION, supra note 24, at 40, 59.
97 Matheson, 450 U.S. at 412-13 (emphasis in original omitted). This argument was
lambasted by Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun in the dissent. They cited pregnancy-
related health services such as diagnostic tests that may reveal birth defects and decisions to
undergo surgery to save the life of the child as stressful for the minor. It was clear to these
Justices that "the mere fact of pregnancy and the experience of childbirth can produce
psychological upheaval." Id. at 445 n.38 (Marshall, Brennan, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
Furthermore, the pregnancy disposition decision implicates other serious issues such as the
future education, socioeconomic status, and employment of the adolescent. See id.
98 See id. at 411 n.20; see also Nancy Adler et al., Psychological Factors in Abortion: A
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attitudes and psychological well-being following abortion do not support the
contention that abortion is followed by emotional or psychological stress, 99 and
compared to adolescents carrying their pregnancy to term, adolescents who
abort have been shown to have more adaptive and sound psychological and
emotional health. 100
E. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In 1992, the Supreme Court upheld a one-parent consent statute with
judicial bypass in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.1° 1 In Casey, the Court
rejected spousal notification after considering the risks of abuse when a woman
is forced to notify a spouse. 1°2 While the relationships of parent/child and
husband/wife are not equivalent, the risks of intra-family abuse to women and
children are similar. Adult and adolescent women "have the same capacity to
conceive and to be intimidated into not exercising their reproductive
freedom." 10 3 The extensive examination of statistical and theoretical research
findings about spousal abuse in the Court's opinion was not followed by a
similar inquiry into child abuse. 104 The Court did not attempt to examine the
Review, 47 AM. PSYCHOiOGIsr 1194 (1992). These authors identified biases in abortion
literature arising from ideological viewpoints. They conclude that these biases caused
researchers to expect severe negative responses to abortion and have led to methodological
flaws in numerous studies. See id. at 1197. Such a flaw may explain the disparity between the
study cited by the Court and the substantial weight of evidence presented in this Note.
99 See Jeanne Marecek, Consequences of Adolescent Childbearing and Abortion, in
ADOLESCENT ABORTION, supra note 24, at 96, 110.
100 See Virginia L. Dixon, Teenage Pregnancy: A Personality Comparison of Prenatal
and Abortion Groups, 38 DISSERTATION ABsTrAcrs INT'L, 168A (1977); Ruth Falk et al.,
Personality Factors Related to Black Teenage Pregnancy and Abortion, 5 PSYCHOL. WOMEN
Q. 737, 745 (1981); F. Kane & P. Lachenbruch, Adolescent Pregnancy: A Study of Aborters
and Non-Aborters, 43 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 796, 800-02 (1973).
101 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
102 Id. at 898.
103 Leonard Berman, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: Supreme Neglect for
Unemancipated Minors'Abortion Rights, 37 How. L.J. 577, 578 (1994) (arguing that minors
and adults should be extended equal protection by the Court).
104 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 891-92. In its examination of spousal abuse, the Court found
that the women affected by spousal notification provisions in the statute (1) had good reason
not to inform their husbands, (2) were justified based on empirical data, and (3) may be
prevented from exercising their right to obtain an abortion. See id. at 891-94. Social science
data suggests that adolescents face an even greater risk of experiencing violence than older
mothers. A study conducted in Alaska, Maine, Oklahoma, and West Virginia indicated that
"between 7.5% and 10.7% of all teenage mothers reported that they had been 'physically hurt
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issues facing minors with similar thoroughness because the Court believed that
children "[do] not realize that their parents have their best interests at heart." 105
The Court's approval of the bypass provision available to minors supports the
view that "[a] minor must sustain much more onerous abortion regulations due
to her legal disability as a minor." 1°6
Casey did include a sensitive examination of the privacy rights of all
women. The Court recognized that its obligation in abortion cases is to define
liberty, not to mandate a moral code.' 07 Thus, the majority examined privacy
issues to enable the provision of meaningful reproductive choice. 10 8 A similar
approach would be essential to determining the privacy rights of minors.
However, it seems clear that the Court feels compelled to allow the imposition
of a moral judgment from a third party into the abortion decisions of
adolescents. While the purpose of parental involvement statutes is not said to be
the promotion of a certain moral position, in effect adolescents are subjected to
the judge's morality during bypass proceedings. 109 For example, a Michigan
probate judge stated that he would grant bypass permission only to victims of
by their husband or partner during the 12 months preceding childbirth'-and these are
probably underestimates." Mott, supra note 79, at 474 n.17 (citing M.J. Vandecastle et al.,
Physical Violence During the Twelve Months Preceding Childirth-Alaska, Maine,
Oklahoma, and West Virginia, 1990-91, 43 MoRBmrY & MORTAurY WKLY. REP. 132,
132-36 (1994)).
105 Id. at 895. Such a statement would be offensive if suggested to adult women.
Commentators have argued that, in supporting parental authority, the Casey Court "clung to
the last bastion of male reproductive-rights control-paternal authority in the home and
surrogate state-fatherhood in the bypass proceeding-all the while proclaiming its altruistic
concern for the safety and well-being of the minor." Berman, supra note 103, at 577.
Furthermore, Casey recognizes a "husband's 'deep and proper concern and interest.., in his
wife's pregnancy,"' but does not find this sufficient to justify spousal involvement in the
abortion decision. Id. at 587 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 895).
106 Berman, supra note 103, at 584.
107 Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
10 8 See id. In Casey, the Court recognized the burden of carrying a pregnancy to term:
"[L]iberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to
the law. The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical
constraints, to pain that only she must bear." Id. at 852. The Court acknowledged that the
suffering of a pregnant woman is too intimate and personal for the state to regulate, regardless
of society's feeling of entitlement to do so given the course of our history or culture. Again,
such reasoning was not applied with similar weight to pregnant minors.
109 "It is difficult to conceive of any reason, aside from a judge's personal opposition to
abortion, that would justify a finding that an immature woman's best interests would be
served by forcing her to endure pregnancy and childbirth against her will." Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 475 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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incest and to white girls raped by black men. 110 Several courts have also
acknowledged that the trial judge's moral position clearly influenced the
application of legal reasoning and discretion during the bypass proceeding.111
F. Recent "Developments": Planned Parenthood v. Miller
Recent developments in parental involvement case law are not really
"developments." In fact, the approach to parental involvement has been
stagnant, relying on the arguments formulated by the Court in the 1970s. In
light of recent developments in the status of minors in the law, the Court must
revisit the underlying propositions of its parental notification cases. These
propositions have been rendered questionable-if not erroneous-by social
science data that has accumulated since the last time the Court appeared to
seriously examine the issue of adolescent abortion rights.
In Planned Parenthood v. Miller,112 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
recycled the Supreme Court's discussion of the decisionmaking capabilities of
adolescents, concluding that immature minors are not capable of making
informed, independent decisions about abortion. 113 The South Dakota statute
reviewed by the Eighth Circuit required the physician to notify a parent of a
minor's decision to abort at least forty-eight hours before the procedure. 114 The
court concluded that a minor's choice to terminate a pregnancy may be
110 See Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Case Note, When Is a Pregnant Minor Mature? When Is an
Abortion in Her Best Interests? The Ohio Supreme Court Applies Ohio's Abortion Parental
Notification Law: In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1991), 60 U. QN. L. REV. 907,
932 (1992) (citing Judge Bourisseau, UPI, Apr. 26, 1991).
111 See T.L.J. v. Webster, 792 F.2d 734, 738-39 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Jane Doe,
No. 93AP-428, slip op. at 1277 (Ohio Ct. App., Apr. 2, 1993). "The real point of the bypass
procedure is the exercise of adult control of children, and particularly adult manipulation of
children-made possible by children's political and legal vulnerability-to make political
points: in this case, to take the brunt of political efforts to block abortion rights." Veith, supra
note 20, at 474.
112 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom Janklow v. Planned Parenthood,
116 S. Ct. 1582 (1996). Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (1993), is the only other
parental involvement case to reach the United States Court of Appeals level since Casey.
Barnes upheld a two-parent consent statute with a bypass provision. See id. at 1341. The
rationale of Barnes parallels that set forth by the Miller court, with one notable difference: the
standard of review of a facial challenge to a statute. See infra note 117.
113 Id. at 1460.
114 See id. at 1454 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34-23A-7). Three exceptions to
this notification requirement were: (1) medical emergency, (2) a patient's certification that a
parent has been notified, and (3) a physician's report that the minor has stated that she is an
abused or neglected child. See id. at 1454-55 n.2.
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regulated by the State, as long as the State provided an expeditious bypass
proceeding.1 15
Although the disposition of Miller did not expand the privacy rights of
adolescents, the Eighth Circuit's opinion is notable in two respects. First, the
court evaluated the burden of parental involvement statutes only with respect to
those minors who do not notify their parents. Large numbers of minors notify
or consult with their parents about the abortion decision; thus no burden exists
for the vast majority of young women. 116 Rather than analyze the burden with
respect to all minors, the court held that "the proper focus of constitutional
inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom
the law is irrelevant." 117 The court then analyzed whether, in a majority of
115 See id. at 1459 (citing Bellotti/ , 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979)). The U.S. District
Court for South Dakota had concluded that a bypass procedure was necessary because "[s]tate
and parental interests must yield to the constitutional right of a mature minor, or of an
immature minor whose best interests are contrary to parental involvement, to obtain an
abortion without consulting or notifying the parent or parents." Planned Parenthood v. Miller,
860 F. Supp. 1409, 1415 (D.S.D. 1994).
116 See Miller, 63 F.3d at 1458.
117 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992)). The court in
Miller adopted this approach after the Supreme Court applied this exact standard when it
reviewed the burden of spousal notification statutes. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894. The federal
circuit courts are split on the issue of whether the standard for a facial challenge to a statute
was changed in Casey. Id. U.S. v. Salerno established that a challenge to the facial
constitutionality of a statute must show that "no set of circumstances exists under which the
act would be valid." 481 U.S. 739, 745. In Miller, the Eighth Circuit maintained that Casey
effectively overruled Salerno for facial challenges to abortion statutes, even though it did not
expressly overrule Salerno. Miller, 63 F.3d at 1458. Miller focuses on the statement in Casey
that the law will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion:
"[]n a large fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant .... [it] is an undue burden and
therefore invalid." Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 894). The Eighth Circuit noted that the
statute would not meet the Casey criteria, but would pass a facial challenge under the Salerno
standard. Id.
In Barnes v. Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit continued to apply the Salerno standard,
reasoning that the Court would not change a longstanding precedent sub silentio. See Barnes,
970 F.2d 12, 14 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992). The standard of review question was discussed at length
in the opinions accompanying the Court's decision to deny certiorari in Jankow v. Planned
Parenthood, 116 S. Ct. 1582. Justice Stevens, concurring in the denial, argued that
"Salerno's rigid and unwise dictum has been properly ignored" in cases subsequent to Casey.
Id. at 1583 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissenting in the denial,
argued that the unmistakable split between the Fifth and Eighth Circuits demands review
regarding the Salerno question. See id. at 1585 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As noted in Miller,
application of the Salerno standard would be fatal to a challenge to most parental involvement
cases even given the arguments presented in this Note.
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cases in which it may impact the minor, it is an undue burden.' 18
The Miller opinion is also notable for its examination of the burden
imposed on mature minors by parental involvement statutes. First, the court
found that "[t]he State runs afoul of the Constitution... when it attempts to
give... power [to obstruct their daughter's decision to abort] to parents of
mature daughters capable of making their own informed choices." 119 The court
said if an adolescent woman demonstrates the ability to make mature, informed
consideration of her decision to abort, the state has no legitimate reason to
impose more onerous restrictions on her than those applied to adult women. 120
Immature minors must also have the opportunity to demonstrate that an
abortion would be in their best interest. 121 The court found that because the
State's justification was premised on the best interests of the minor, it no longer
had justification for such additional regulation. 122
IV. THE MISSING LINK: A PSYCHOLEGAL ANALYSIS OF ADOLESCENT
ABORTION
Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence is analogous to Newton's Third Law
of Motion; for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Similarly,
for every compelling argument about a woman's right to abortion, other justices
pose an equally convincing opposing argument. This divisiveness is even more
acute in cases considering the privacy rights of minors. However, the Justices'
disagreement about adolescent abortion is not hopelessly intractable. In fact,
many issues are clarified, if not resolved, by referring to empirical data. The
Court in Casey undertook a thorough examination of the burden of unwanted
pregnancy as well as the risks associated with the spousal notification statute.
This part of the Note will show that parental involvement in abortion must be
re-examined in the same manner.
118 See Miller, 63 F.3d at 1458.
119 Id. at 1460.
120 See id. The Court concluded that "[flor both mature and 'best interest'
minors ... the State has no legitimate interest in imposing a parental-notice requirement with
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in their paths when they seek pre-
viability abortions." Id.
121 See id. The court recognized that parental involvement may function as a third-party
veto. Parents may attempt to obstruct their daughter's attempt to obtain an abortion, therefore
creating "a substantial obstacle for a large fraction of minors seeking pre-viability abortions."
Id. at 1459-60.122 See id. at 1460.
1750 [Vol. 57:1731
WORST OF BOTH WORLDS
A. Consequences of Childbearing and Abortion
Throughout the parental involvement cases, the Court has asserted that the
medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an abortion are serious
and can be lasting.1 23 Although young women are slightly more likely to suffer
postabortion stress, 124 abortion has fewer and less protracted consequences than
carrying a pregnancy to term and raising the child. 125 Studies of women's
attitudes and psychological well-being following abortion do not support the
contention that abortion is followed by deep regret, self-reproach, and long-
standing emotional damage. 126 Furthermore, the Court and legislatures seem to
have neglected the fact that the pregnancy disposition does not involve health
considerations alone. The far-reaching implications of an adolescent's decision
whether to become a parent have not seriously been considered by the Court.127
In fact, comparisons of personality functioning of adolescents who carry to term
and those who abort generally show more adaptive, healthier functions in the
latter group. 128
The Justices who support expanded privacy rights for minors frequently
noted that a minor's choice to carry a pregnancy to term will affect her
education, employment skills, financial resources, and maturity. 129
The legislative assumption behind... parental [involvement] statute[s] is
that minor motherhood is a categorically sound institution that should be
legislatively promoted. The... legislature [does not enact] parental
involvement statutes for minors contemplating motherhood. Minor mothers do
not have to prove to the state that they are mature or that motherhood is in their
best interest. Despite a wealth of documentation suggesting that minor
motherhood is fraught with peril... [t]he stance of anti-abortion legislators is
"have your baby at all costs." Conversely, abortion seeking unemancipated
minors are scrutinized and harassed for seeking to exercise their fundamental
rights. 1 3 0
Sixty-eight percent of pregnancies during adolescence are unintended.131 It
123 See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981).
124 See Marecek, supra note 99, at 110.
125 See id. at 109.
126 See id. at 110.
127 See Berman, supra note 103, at 597.
128 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
129 See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 440 (1981) (Marshall, Brennan, &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Bellotti H, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979)).
130 Berman, supra note 103, at 585 (citation omitted).
131 See Henshaw & Van Vort, supra note 4, at 86. Similar findings in a 1988 National
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is uncontroverted that bearing a child during teenage years will effect a
woman's educational and occupational attainment, economic status, marital
experience, and subsequent childbearing.' 32 Two studies have shown that, in
their twenties, adolescent mothers had lower educational attainment than their
nonparent counterparts, controlling for socioeconomic status, intellectual
interests, and educational aspirations before pregnancy.' 33 An adolescent
mother will also have lower economic status, affected by her employment
history, occupational status, household income, and welfare dependency. 134
The likelihood of welfare dependency is strongly influenced by the mother's
age at first birth. Forty-six percent of women who gave birth before the age of
fifteen, twenty-eight percent of those who gave birth between the ages of fifteen
and seventeen, and fourteen percent of those who gave birth at eighteen or
nineteen years are on public assistance. 135 Between twenty-five and thirty
percent of mothers under the age of eighteen have a repeat pregnancy within
two years. 136
Maternal and Infant Health Survey show that 22% of births to minors were "wanted" at the
interview date, which was after the birth of the child. See Mott, supra note 79, at 476 (citing
FRANK L. Mor & STEPHEN V. QUINLAN, MATERNAL-CI-D HEALTH DATA IN THE NLSU
(1991)); see also Merritt, supra note 5, at 443 n.12 (citing numerous studies from the 1970s
to 1995 regarding unintended pregnancies).
132 See Marecek, supra note 99, at 98-102. Women who were teenage mothers are
"less likely to complete their education, to be employed, to earn high wages, and to be
happily married; and are most likely to have larger families and to receive welfare" than
women who delay childbirth until their twenties. Deborah Jones Merritt, supra note 5, at 441
n.1 (citing National Research Council, 1 RISKING TiE FuTun 138 (1987)).
13 3 See Josephina J. Card, Consequences of Adolescent Childbearing for the Young
Parent's Future Personal and Professional Life 1, 58 (1977), microformed on ERIC No. ED
195, 901 (Educ. Resources Info. Ctr.); see also Mott, supra note 79, at 474 (citing Frank L.
Mott & William Marsiglio, Early Childbearing and Completion of High School, 17 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 234, 234-37 (1985)). Nineteen year olds bearing children have only a 68%
chance of receiving a high school diploma compared with about 87% for a full cross section
of young adults. Id.
134 See Marecek, supra note 99, at 100.
135 See id.
13 6 See Mott, supra note 79, at 475 (citing Debra S. Kalmuss & Pearila B. Namerow,
Subsequent Childbearing Among Teenage Mothers: The Determinants of a Closely Spaced
Second Birth, 26 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 149, 149-53 (1994)). These findings correspond with
other studies that have shown that young women who have their first child in their teens are
more likely to have a repeat pregnancy within a year than older women. See also Janet B.
Hardy et al., Long-Range Outcome of Adolescent Pregnancy, 21 CuNmcAL OBSTEmcs &
GYNECOLOGY 1215, 1230 (1978). In a study of inner-city women, the rate of repeat
pregnancies within a year was 47% for adolescents and 23% for women in their twenties.
Further, the age of partners at marriage is related to marital stability. Marital instability is a
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B. The Decisionmaking Capabilities of Adolescents
In Bellotti /,1 37 the Court held that, because some minors lack the ability to
make fully informed choices that consider both immediate and long-range
consequences, parental involvement is desirable.138  The Court also
acknowledged that a young woman may be mature and well-informed enough
to make a decision independent of parental consultation.1 39 By mandating a
bypass procedure to adjudicate maturity or best interests, the Court presumed
that a minor does not have the capacity to consent to abortion. This
presumption is challenged by substantial evidence that shows that adolescents
are capable of adult-level decisionmaking regarding medical treatment and
abortion.
Significant converging evidence from studies conducted since the late 1970s
demonstrates that adolescents do not substantially differ from adults in their
ability to understand and reason about medical treatment alternatives. 140 One
study tested age-related difference in the pregnancy disposition decision of
adolescent and adult patients at pregnancy clinics. 14 1 The study found that
firther cause of stress, and divorce has negative economic implications for women. See L.
Bumpass & J. Sweet, Differentials in Marital Instability: 1970, 37 AM. Soc. REv. 754, 755,
761-62 (1972); Card, supra note 133, at 52, 58; Kristin A. Moore & Sandra L. Hofferth,
The Consequences of Early Childbearing: Research Summary 1, 17 (1977), microformed on
ERIC No. ED 149, 002 (Educ. Resources Info. Ctr.).
137 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
138 Id. at 640.
139 See id. at 643.
140 See Melton & Pliner, supra note 24, at 18 (citing Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling,
Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412 (1978);
Gary B. Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of the Art, 22 J. FAM.
LAw 445, 463-66 (1984); C-m.DREN's COMPETENCE TO CoNsENT (Gary B. Melton et al.,
eds., 1983); Lois A. Weithorn, Developmental Factors and Competence to Make Informed
Treatment Decisions, in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTNG CHImD AN YourH SEaviCEs 85 (Gary
B. Melton ed., 1982); see also Mary S. Griffin-Carlson & Kathleen J. Mackin, Parental
Consent: Factors Inf4lencing Adolescent Disclosure Regarding Abortion, 28 ADOLESCENCE 1
(1993). But see, Wanda Franz & David Reardon, Differential Impact of Abortion on
Adolescents and Adults, 27 ADOLESCENCE 161 (1992); William Gardner et al., Asserting
Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PsYCHOL.
895 (1989)).
14 1 See Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors' and Adults' Pregnancy
Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCmATRY 446, 446 (1980). Lewis sampled 26 adults and 16
adolescents at three California clinics. These subjects were making real and hypothetical
pregnancy decisions. Based on the small sample and methodological limitations, Lewis
cautioned against over-reliance on these findings.
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adolescents and adults did not differ in four respects: (1) knowledge of the law
and factors affecting a decision to abort, deliver and put the baby up for
adoption, or carry to term and keep the baby;142 (2) the number of individuals
consulted or expected to be consulted about her choice to deliver or abort; 143
(3) the tendency to consult the partner, parents, or members of peer group; 144
and (4) the expectation that conflicting advice will be received from each
source, or the expectation that advice will favor pregnancy or abortion. 145
A subsequent study compared adolescents and adults in hypothetical
medical treatment dilemmas. 146 This study found that adolescents as young as
fourteen were able to articulate factual and inferential understanding of
treatment alternatives as well as adults. 147 These findings are supported by
studies of adolescent decisionmaking in other health-related contexts. 148
States recognize the decisionmaking capabilities of minors in consent laws
that give all females, regardless of age, the right to consent to pregnancy-related
medical services-with the stark exception of abortion. The Supreme Court has
argued that carrying a pregnancy to term involves few of the potentially grave
emotional and psychological consequences of the decision to abort. 149
However, carrying a pregnancy to term and many pregnancy-related services
"Adolescents are able to provide a medical history for abortions as well as any other
group of individuals." American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 12 Cal. 4th 1007, 1046
n.2 (1996). As a practical matter, it is easier to get teens to disclose pertinent information
such as previous abortions or sexually transmitted diseases outside the presence of parents. Id.
(quoting testimony of Dr. Michael Policar, Board Certified in Obstetrics and Gynecology and
faculty member, at the University of California, San Francisco Medical School).
142 See Lewis, supra note 141, at 447.
143 See id. at 448.
144 See Id.
145 See id. at 448. The study indicated some age-related differences between adolescents
and adults. Minors were more likely to believe that their decision was the product of parental
wishes, and were less likely to consult a professional about the decision. See id.146 See Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 67, at 1589.
147 See id. at 1589. Given the hypothetical nature of these studies, it is arguable that the
reasoning of both adults and adolescents would be different in a real decision.
148 See generally Howard S. Adelman et al., Competence of Minors to Understand,
Evaluate, and Communicate About Their Psycho Educational Problems, 16 PROF. PSYCHOL.:
RES. & PRAC. 426 (1985) (concluding that minors can understand the risks and benefits'
associated with psychotherapeutic interventions); Michael C. Roberts et al., Children's
Perceptions of Medical and Psychological Disorders in Their Peers, 10 J. CLImcAL CHD
PSYcHOL. 76 (1981) (finding that 9-13 year old minors were sensitive to variations in
diagnosis, etiology, treatment, and prognosis among disorders).149 See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412-13 (1981).
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carry a higher risk than abortion 150 and bear similar, if not more severe,
emotional consequences.1 51 The Court explained that this disparity stemmed
from a different State concern about abortion. 152 Yet it speaks to a glaring
inconsistency: Is the state concerned with how well a teen decides or what she
decides in making a pregnancy disposition decision?
The Court's holdings that presume the incapacity of adolescents are also
influenced by a belief that it is unlikely that a minor will obtain adequate
guidance and counsel from the physician performing the abortion procedure.'
53
This conclusion is based on information provided to the Court in 1979 during
its consideration of Bellotti ff.15 4 The landscape of abortion statutes has changed
drastically since that time; now most states require informed consent and
waiting periods for all women. 155 Furthermore, minors studied in
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Minnesota were thoroughly counseled about
their options by the time of their judicial bypass proceeding. 156
C. The Vulnerability of Adolescents
The "state interest" arguments advanced by the states in the parental
involvement cases converge upon one element: the vulnerability of minors.
Statistics support the urgency of the states' concerns. Approximately 500,000
babies are born to teenage girls each year. 157 Almost one million teens become
pregnant each year. 158 Births to adolescents declined for two decades until
150 See id. at 444 (Marshall, Brennan, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). It is well
documented that in the United States the risk of dying from complications related to childbirth
is about seven times the risk from having an abortion. See Russo, supra note 96, at 59.
151 For further discussion, see supra Part IV.A.
152 See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 412.
153 See id. at 410.
154 The Bellotti ff Court quoted Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Danforth, which
stated that counseling occurred entirely on the day of the procedure and that minors were
counseled in groups with adults for two hours, with only brief individual consultation with
medical personnel who described the procedure, its risks, and birth control techniques. See
Bellotti ff, 443 U.S. 622, 641 n.21 (1979). Courts have also suggested that a physician will
not act on behalf of the minor like a parent or a neutral judge because a physician "may have
a direct, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion... or a personal bias in favor
of-or against-abortion." American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 12 Cal. 4th 1007,
1035 (1996).
155 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884-87 (1992).
156 See Secrest, supra note 10, at 708.
157 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHEroRIc: A NEw AMEmCAN
AGENDA FOR CHL)REN AND FAMILIES 4 (1991).
158 See id. at 33.
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1986, when the trend reversed. 159 More than half of unmarried women from
age fifteen to nineteen have engaged in sexual intercourse at least one time.160
Three-quarters of unmarried women and 86% of unmarried men are sexually
active by age nineteen. 161
The vulnerability of a minor confronting a pregnancy disposition decision
may lead to postabortion psychological stress. A 1993 study found that,
compared to adult women, adolescent women are more likely to be dissatisfied
with the choice of abortion. 162 The study also reported that adolescent women
were more likely (1) to have had abortions later in the gestational period, (2) to
be dissatisfied with the services at the time of the abortion, (3) to feel forced by
circumstances to have an abortion, and (4) to report being less informed or
misinformed at the time of the abortion. 163 The authors of this study suggest
that these factors indicate that "women contemplating an abortion [must] have a
feeling of being frlly informed, of having time to make an adequate decision,
and of not being pressured to have an abortion if they do not believe it is
appropriate for them." 164 Clearly, in families with good communication, an
adolescent should be encouraged, but not forced, to involve her parents in order
to have time to contemplate her decision in a supportive environment.
However, while parental involvement may help alleviate these factors for some
women, it is not essential to a formula to reduce postabortion stress. A
counselor or medical professional could also provide for those young women
who reject the involvement of their parents. This study demonstrates a clear
relationship between management of preabortion indecisiveness and
postabortion stress. Such a connection indicates that legislatively mandated
injection of stress-in the form of parental involvement or a judicial bypass
procedure-will only negatively impact the postabortion health of young
159 See id.
160 See id. at 223.
161 See id. Lack of education puts adolescents at risk as well. Forty percent of children
are at risk of failure in school. See id. at 181-82. In 1988, dropouts were two times as likely
to be unemployed as high school graduates and five times as likely as college graduates to be
unemployed. Students with poor academic skills are nine times more likely to have a child out
of wedlock and more than twice as likely to be arrested as academically advanced peers. See
id.
162 See Franz & Reardon, supra note 140, at 161. This study compared adolescent and
adult reactions to abortion using a sample obtained from women who had enrolled in support
groups after having a negative reaction to abortion. It sampled 252 women from 42 states.
The authors concede that this group is not representative of the entire population of women
who have had abortions (because the sample was "self-selected" for postabortion stress). Id.
Therefore this data cannot be generalized to all women who have had abortions.
163 See id. at 166.
164 Id. at 169.
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women.
Researchers have identified the most critical factor affecting the psyche of
an adolescent during her pregnancy disposition decision: her perception of
social support in making her decision.1 65 Perceived social support from her
partner, parents, or peers has been reported as the single most important
determinant of psychological reaction to abortion. 166 Children value the support
of their parents and partners in this decision. 167 Furthermore, health care
professionals have been found to provide crucial support. 168 Women who
thought their physicians' attitudes were positive and who reacted positively to
treatment by other health care workers were more likely to have a positive
reaction to the procedure. 169 Despite some negative experiences, women who
terminate an unwanted pregnancy are better adjusted and feel less negative
about their experience than women who give babies up for adoption. 170 Teens
interviewed two years after an adolescent abortion indicated that it led them to
become more mature.' 71 This sample of minors also improved their
contraceptive practices following an abortion.1 72
A young, vulnerable, pregnant teenager deserves conscientious treatment
by state legislatures. Psychological studies supplement the impressions of the
court. A theoretical model that incorporates several empirical studies about
abortion decisionmaking found that minors face an incredible amount of stress
acknowledging their pregnancy, formulating and weighing disposition options,
choosing an option, and becoming committed to that option.173 This significant
amount of preabortion stress for adolescents is comparable to that of adult
women, who reported that indecision makes "the time between detection of
pregnancy and the abortion... more stressful than the postabortion period." 174
165 See Nancy E. Adler & Peggy Dolcini, Psychological Issues in Abortion for
Adolescents, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL IssUES, supra note 24,
at74, 87.
166 See D.T. Moseley et al., Psychological Factors That Predict Reaction to Abortion,
37 J. CLINICALPSYCHOL. 276 (1981).
167 See Adler & Dolcini, supra note 165, at 87.168 See id. at 87-88.
169 See David A. Evans & John P. Gusdon, Jr., Postabortion Attitudes, 34 N.C. MED.
J. 271,273 (1973); Leon Marder, Psychiatric Experience with Liberalized Abortion Law, 126
AM. J. PSYCWATRY 1230, 1236 (1970); George S. Walter, Psychologic and Emotional
Consequences of Elective Abortion, 36 OBsTETICs & GYNECOLOGY 482, 487 (1970).
170 See Adler & Dolcini, supra note 165, at 90.
171 See id. at 91.172 See id.
173 See id. at 75-82.
174 Id. at 76-77. Physical risks exist as well. The most dangerous effect of the stressful
decisiomnaking period is the delay of obtaining pregnancy related services, whether it be
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Although reluctant at first, fifty percent of minors found guidance from
their mothers in formulating and weighing options. 175 However, these teens
also reported the most conflict over the decision. 176 The causal relationship of
the conflict and consultation is not clear: Did they need adult guidance and
support because of the conflict or did adult guidance cause more conflict?177
The younger the adolescent, the more likely she is to involve the parent.178
Therefore, parental involvement statutes disproportionately affect older, more
mature, adolescents.
In support of parental involvement statutes, the United States Supreme
Court has held that these statutes (1) must be in place to sustain parental
authority to raise their children, 179 (2) are desirable because some parents have
profound moral and religious concerns about abortion,'80 and (3) allow parents
to act in the best interests of their child.181 Justices who have dissented in
parental involvement cases present strong arguments to the contrary. They
assert that, for many minors, parental involvement creates family and personal
problems. 182 Second, they state that the parental involvement statutes extend the
legal limits of parental authority rights, as parents are given the power to
interfere with their daughter's decision or to limit her access to abortion
services. 183 Third, they argue that a minor may also "confront physical or
prenatal care or an abortion. Since an adolescent is likely to deny the initial determination of
pregnancy and take longer to select an alternative, delay becomes a major factor in the
psychological and emotional well-being of the women. Second trimester abortions are more
risky and more expensive. Furthermore, patients who delay abortions until the second
trimester feel a greater sense of loss than women who undergo an earlier abortion, regardless
of age. See id. at 86.
175 See id. at 80.
176 See id.
177 See id. at 80-81.
178 See id. at 81.
17 9 See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) (citing Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).180 See id. at 409 (citing Bellotti 1/, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979)).
181 See id.
182 See, e.g., id. at 437 (Marshall, Brennan, & Blackmun, JR., dissenting).
183 See id. at 438 (Marshall, Brennan, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). In LaPorte,
Pennsylvania, a woman was charged with interference with custody in the "first prosecution
in the country of an adult who drove a [minor] to another state [to obtain] an abortion" and
avoid a parental involvement statute. Sandy Banisky, Trial Ties Parental Custody, Abortion
Woman Who Helped Girl Get Abortion Is on Trial in Pa., BALTnMoan SuN, Oct. 29, 1996, at
1A. This case has attracted the attention of both sides of the debate regarding adolescent
abortion rights. Proponents of restrictive legislation point out that the woman was the step-
mother of the 19 year-old man who impregnated the 13 year-old girl, stating that this is a
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emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support, or actual obstruction of the
abortion decision." 18 4 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court evaluated the
impact of spousal notification upon women who did not want to notify
spouses.185 The Casey Court was clearly influenced by statistics that
demonstrated the crisis of domestic violence. Given these statistics, the Court
could not assume that spouses would always regard the best interests of the
women or that a husband would respect his wife's choice in all families.
Similarly disturbing statistics reveal a comparable problem with child abuse:
Each year there are approximately 1,003,600 cases of child neglect and
675,000 cases of child abuse, resulting in the deaths of 1100 children. Yearly,
almost 160,000 children receive serious injuries as a result of maltreatment.
These injuries include loss of consciousness, arrested breathing, broken bones,
third degree burns, schooling loss, and loss of special education services.
Additionally, 952,600 children sustain moderate injuries or impairments. These
include bruises, depression, and emotional distress that lasts at least forty-eight
hours.... The increase in the number of reports of child abuse in recent years
has been astronomical. 186
The perpetrators of this abuse are rarely strangers to the children. In fact,
"'flJn more than ninety percent of the cases the child is victimized... by a
parent, other family member, orfiiend known to the child.'"18 7 Information
regarding an adolescent's pregnancy may create or intensify an abusive
situation. The petitioners in Planned Parenthood v. Miller asserted that a "non-
abusive parent-child relationship can become abusive or neglectful after the
parent learns of the daughter's pregnancy or desire to have an abortion." 188
Planned Parenthood also argued that the best interests of abused minors will not
be protected by the state because, if the abuser instills secrecy in the child or the
child is protective of her abuser, certain exceptions to parental involvement may
disturbing, but not rare, circumvention of parental authority. Id. Opponents of restrictions to
adolescent abortion rights point out that the woman did not assist the pregnant teen in her
pregnancy disposition decision, she merely transported her to the clinic because she felt that
an adult should make the long distance trip. Opponents maintain that this case may mark a
disturbing trend to further restrict adolescents' access to abortion services. Id.
184 Matheson, 450 U.S. at 438-39 (Marshall, Brennan, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
185 Planned parentlood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992).
186 Raymond O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children Versus
Parents, 26 CoNN. L. Rnv. 1209, 1234 (1994) (citations omitted).
187 Id. (quoting CHmDRENS DEFENSE FUND, A CHILDENS DEFENSE BuDGEr: FY 1988,
AN ANALYSIS OF OUR NATION'S INVSTvE IN CHIDREN 175 (1987)) (emphasis added).
188 Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1462 (8th Cir. 1995).
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not be availed to her.189
D. Impact of Notification and Consent Statutes
The general objectives of parental involvement statutes and the
accompanying bypass procedures are (1) to assure that minors make well-
reasoned pregnancy disposition decisions with their parents, and (2) to assure
that a minor who does not want to involve her parents is mature or seeks an
abortion in her best interests. Various studies have been able to gauge the
impact of parental notification and consent statutes and their judicial bypass
procedures. These studies have concluded that parental involvement laws are
not functioning as intended in (1) effectively compelling young women to
involve their parents, (2) thoroughly examining and accurately determining the
maturity of a minor, or (3) treating the minor with sensitivity and concern.
Parental involvement statutes have not been able to increase the number of
parents involved in a minor's pregnancy disposition decision. 19 Prior to the
enactment of the Minnesota parental notification statute, thirty-seven percent of
women informed their mothers and twenty-six percent informed their
fathers.191 Younger women were more likely than older adolescents to inform
their parents. 192 After Minnesota enacted a parental notification statute, 193 a
study compared adolescent abortion in Minnesota and Wisconsin (where there
was no notification or consent statute). 194 Only slightly more minors notified
both parents in Minnesota (43.5%) than in Wisconsin (32.4%); almost the same
percentage notified at least one parent (65.3% and 62.1%, respectively). 195
Two studies, one in Michigan and one nationwide, support the data of the
Minnesota/Wisconsin comparison. 196 In Michigan, a state with no notification
requirement, fifty-seven percent of pregnant minors involved their parents. 197
The judicial bypass procedure remains problematic because it is viewed by
189 See id. at 1463.
190 See Freddie Clary, Minor Women Obtaining Abortions: A Study of Parental
Notification in a Metropolitan Area, 72 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 283, 284-85 (1982).
191 See id. at 284.
192 See id.
193 This statute required two-parent notification and was found unconstitutional in
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
194 Blum et al., supra note 15, at 619.
195 See id.
196 See Secrest, supra note 10, at 699-700.
197 See id. The tendency to involve at least one parent was similar for minors choosing
abortion (56%) and those who decided to carry the pregnancy to term and keep the child
(53 %). See id.
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almost everyone involved-except the distressed teen-as a rubber stamp
procedure. In fact, data indicate that "courts cannot discriminate mature from
immature minors, and that minors are put at greater risk by delaying the
abortion in order to obtain third-party consent." 198 One judge stated that his
role was simply a routine clerical one. 199 In the opinion of another judge, the
only achievement of the bypass procedure was to erect another barrier to
minors' access to abortion.20 A Massachusetts study found negligible variance
in the determination of maturity or best interests.2 01 In 477 proceedings, all but
nine adolescents were adjudged mature; of those nine, eight were allowed
abortions in their best interests. 2°2 This study also found that hearings lasted on
average 12.12 minutes, with ninety-two percent of them taking no more than
twenty minutes. 203 This data is supported by testimony presented in Hodgson v.
Minnesota, in which the trial court found that, of 3,573 judicial bypass petitions
filed from August 1, 1981, to March 1, 1986, all but fifteen were granted. 204
The indirect sources of information for the Massachusetts study (appellate
reviews and lawyers' affidavits) 205 revealed horrifying reports of treatment of
minors during bypass proceedings. 206 Affiants demonstrated that questions in
the proceeding often "served primarily to upset minors rather than to generate
helpful information."20 7 For example, some judges questioned minors
regarding the morality of their sexual activity.20 8 One adolescent was asked "to
give a definition of a ruptured uterus and to explain how hemorrhaging may
lead to death." 2 9 Furthermore, judges have stated that they come to a
198 Pliner & Yates, supra note 14, at 203.
199 See Secrest, supra note 10, at 704.
200 See id.
201 See id. at 702 (citing Suzanne Yates & Anita J. Pliner, Judging Maturity in the
Courts: The Massachusetts Consent Statute, 78 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 648 (1988)).
202 See Pliner & Yates, supra note 14, at 209.
203 See id.
204 See id. at 207. In the ten years the Massachusetts parental involvement statute has
been enforced, courts have ruled on 9,000 bypass petitions, "of which all but 13 were
granted. All 13 denials were appealed and only one was affirmed (in that case parents gave
consent and the minor obtained the abortion)." American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren,
12 Cal. 4th 1007, 1051 n.12 (1996).
205 Affidavits were solicited by Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts for a
lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the bypass provision. See Pliner & Yates, supra
note 14, at2ll.2 06 See id. at 207.
207 Id. at 211.
208 See id.
209 Id. Judges have also asked minors questions such as: How would it feel to have a
dead child? Are you aware that abortion may affect your fertility? See Deborah L. Rhode,
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conclusion regarding maturity for reasons such as the adolescent's possession of
general information and vocabulary skills, and the adolescent's appearance and
degree of articulateness. 210 These findings are supported by anecdotal evidence
from juvenile courts in Ohio, where pregnant teens are often judged as
automatically immature. 211 For example, courts in judicial bypass decisions
may determine the maturity of the teen based on her conduct (sexual activity,
for example) rather than on her maturity or best interests.212 Specifically, a
juvenile court judge in Stark County, Ohio, stated that he considered any
sixteen-year-old who got pregnant to be immature.213 Clearly, others perceive a
teen's decision to abort as demonstrating a mature response to the situation,214
given the impact of single motherhood upon her education, socioeconomic
status, and development of her child.2 15
Such findings support the argument that confidence in the judicial bypass
procedure is unwarranted because of (1) the questionable ability of judges to
make sound decisions on behalf of individual pregnant minors, and (2) the need
for the careful decisionmaking, sensitivity, and stress reduction for the
adolescent. 216 This evidence shows that mandatory third-party decisionmaking
cannot advance the state's concern for adolescents by adjusting to their needs of
concern, sympathy, and careful attention.217
Bypass procedures also cause delay. In Massachusetts, 4.2 days on average
passed between the date of contacting an attorney and the date of the
Adolescent Pregnancy and Public Policy, in THE PoLmcs OF PREGNANCY: ADOIECENT
SExuALTY AND PuBuc PoiicY 301, 320 (Annette Lawson & Deborah L. Rhode eds.,
1993).2 10 See Pliner & Yates, supra note 14, at 210-11.
211 See Stuhlbarg, supra note 110, at 930. After Judge George Twyford, a juvenile court
judge in Franklin County, Ohio, rejected all of the bypass petitions before him (most of which
were struck down by the court of appeals), the court of appeals suggested that Judge Twyford
had preconceived notions regarding the maturity of the pregnant minors. "As a result [the
court] strongly encouraged any judge who cannot fairly and impartially consider [the
important issues presented at the bypass hearing] to recuse himself from any involvement in
such proceedings." In re Jane Doe, No. 93AP-428 slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 2,
1993).2 12 See Stuhlbarg, supra note 110, at 927.
2 13 See id. at 932 n.108 (relating phone interview with Director of Planned Parenthood
of Stark County, Ohio, regarding comments made during hearing of In re Jane Doe-i, No.
JU-73642 (Ohio C.P. Oct. 10, 1990)).
2 14 See Melton & Pliner, supra note 24, at 19.
2 15 See id. at 17.
2 16 See id. at 28-29.
217 See Belloti I, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 550 (1971)).
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hearing.218 Any delay will be significant with a population that has already been
found to delay the pregnancy disposition decision. For example, in Minnesota,
almost all bypass proceedings are conducted in St. Paul, Minneapolis, or
Duluth. Minors may have to make a round trip of up to five hundred miles to
exercise the bypass option.219 Parental notification and consent statutes have
been found to cause more young women to travel out of state to obtain
abortions. 22 0 In Massachusetts, before the statute was implemented, few women
traveled out of state for abortions, but in the first month of implementation,
130% more minors obtained abortions out of state.221
V. MAKING THE BEST OF A BAD SITUATION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT STATUTES
States that regulate adolescents' access to abortion claim they are protecting
the best interests of minors. Numerous studies have shown that minors are
capable of adult decisionmaking, but, like adult women, they undergo
significant stress during their pregnancy disposition decision. At the peak of this
stress, states force minors to either inform their parents or appear before a
judge. It is hardly an advancement of the "best interests" of the minors who
choose judicial bypass to undergo a demeaning, rubber-stamp judicial
proceeding to prove their ability to consent.
The answer to providing the "best of both worlds" in an already difficult
situation lies in the counselors and medical professionals that the young woman
contacts to examine the option of abortion. Minors studied in Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Minnesota were thoroughly counseled about their options by
the time of their judicial bypass proceeding. 222 Further, the state takes
counseling time away from the minor if she has to be prepared for a bypass
proceeding. States trust medical personnel to properly counsel minors about
their options for other, potentially serious pregnancy-related medical procedures
and likewise trust that these minors are able to competently confer with
professionals. However, courts and legislatures believe that counseling for
abortion occurs entirely on the day this procedure is to be performed, and that it
is limited to descriptions of the procedure, possible complications, and birth
control techniques. Courts and legislatures are also afraid that young women
2 18 See Secrest, supra note 10, at 703 (citing Yates & Pliner, supra note 201, at 648).
219 See id.
220 See id. at 700-01 (citing Virginia G. Cartoof & Lorraine v. Klernian, Parental
Consent for Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts Law, 76 AM. J. Pu. HEALTH 397, 398
(1986)).
221 See id.
222 See Secrest, supra note 10, at 708.
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are not capable of interacting with a physician if they are obtaining
abortions.223
As an alternative, commentators have suggested lowering the age of
consent to an age low enough to ensure that most mature minors will be able to
avoid a judicial proceeding.224 They argue that the court has not required a
case-by-case determination of maturity, and has also rejected arbitrary age
definitions of maturity as high as eighteen.22- Other commentators have argued
that pregnancy alone should be an objective standard to emancipate a minor
from parental authority. 226
The trend in regulating access to abortion is to require informed consent,
which the state requires medical professionals to receive from a woman seeking
an abortion.227 A similar process can be applied to adolescent women, and the
state should entrust medical professionals to assess the competency of the young
pregnant woman seeking abortion. The medical profession already has fixed
standards for such a professional judgment.228 The factors already considered
by medical professionals in assessing competency include: (1) factual
understanding of the problem and the treatment alternatives, (2) rational
decisionmaking processes, (3) an appreciation for the personal implications of
the decision, (4) ability to make and communicate a choice, (5) reasonableness
of the choice, and (6) general competence. 229 Uniform adherence to these
standards will continue to enforce the state's concern for the minor's
vulnerability and her ability to make informed decisions. However, it will not
do so at her expense, because she will avoid unnecessary and demeaning
judicial proceedings.
The American Medical Association has recommended similar guidelines
for physicians counseling pregnant minors. 230 First, the AMA recommends that
physicians encourage minors to discuss their reproductive options with their
parents. 231 This step is to insure that minors are not overestimating parental
anger about their pregnancy. 232 Second, the AMA concurred with the National
Research Council and the Society for Adolescent Medicine in its statement that
223 See Bellotti//, 443 U.S. 622, 641 n.21 (1979).
224 See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 2, at 150-51.
225 See id.
226 See Veith, supra note 20, at 478-79.
227 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992).
2 28 See Redding, supra note 12, at 704.
229 See id. at 710-11.
230 See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association,
Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, 262 JAMA 82, 82 (1993).
231 See id. at 83.
2 32 See id.
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adolescents should not be required to involve their parents in their pregnancy
disposition decision.233 Third, the AMA found research pertaining to the
decisionmaking capabilities of adolescents convincing and suggested that
physicians treat adolescents like adult patients capable of mature
decisionmaking. At this stage, physicians should ensure that minors have made
an informed decision after giving careful consideration to the issues involved,
and may be encouraged to consult with other adults if parents are not going to
be involved.234
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court claims that states must approach the privacy rights of minors
with respect and sensitivity. However, in attempting to do so itself, the Court
has coldly disregarded the realities that confront young, pregnant women. It has
claimed to rely on "pages of experience" to evaluate the capacity of minors, but
has instead relied on faulty, outdated justifications to deny privacy rights to
adolescents. The "pages of experience" used by the Court to justify parental
involvement must be turned forward to the 1990s. The compelling research
presented in this Note demonstrates that young women forced into parental
involvement or judicial bypass proceedings are generally mature enough to
make a pregnancy disposition decision and will typically experience less stress
and fewer consequences from abortion than from carrying to term. The Court
has maintained that statutes mandating parental involvement protect the
vulnerability of minors. Yet, a young woman who does not want to involve her
parents is coerced into carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term, or forced into
an often demeaning bypass procedure-both of which compound- the
vulnerability that the statutes purport to address. The Court must revisit the
issues in parental involvement statutes to (1) clearly establish the privacy rights
of mature minors, and (2) undertake a thorough empirical examination of the
physical and psychological risks and burdens associated with parental
involvement statutes.
233 See id.
234 See id.
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